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NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIER; RACIAL DISTURBANCE AS
FORESEEABLE DANGER
Bullock v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc.
266 F2d 326 (5th Cir., 1959)
An action for damages resulting from an assault was brought by a
colored passenger and his apparently white wife, natives of Jamaica, who
contracted with defendant for carriage from Miami, Florida to New York.
Neither knew of the segregation customs of Florida, nor was warned of
them by defendant. They took a front seat in a bus at Miami and were
later requested by the driver to move to the rear. No reason being given
for the request, the plaintiffs remained in the same seat. While the bus was
stopped at Perry, Florida, a bystander overheard the driver speak of the
plaintiffs' difference in color and of their position on the bus. He purchased
a ticket to a nearby town, boarded the bus, and assaulted the plaintiffs. The
United States District Court found the assault to have been an unforeseeable
danger which defendant had no duty to protect against.' The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that defendant had been negligent in breaching its
duty to protect passengers from harm resulting from foreseeable dangerous
acts of third parties.
Generally, carriers are required to exercise the highest degree of care
in protecting their passengers from injury resulting from the dangerous acts
of third parties, so long as the danger is reasonably to be foreseen. 2 Florida
follows this general rule.3 The importance of this case lies in the fact that
it is the first to consider the racial climate of the region in determining
foreseeability.
4
The question of foreseeability depends to a very great extent upon
the peculiar facts of the particular case. 5 Courts have found foreseeability
where: (1) strikers and strikebreakers were on the same train and the
conductor took no steps to avert violence;" (2) an intoxicated and disorderly
1 Bullock v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 203 (NiD. Fla. 1958).
2 13 CJ.S. "Carriers" § 678 (1938); 10 Am. Jur. "Carriers" § 1236 (1937);
Prosser, Torts § 38 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 15 A.L.R. 862 (1921); Annot., 42 A.L.R.
168 (1926); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1035 (1926); Restatement, Torts § 348 (1934). The
carrier has an identical duty to protect and to warn against foreseeable dangers to the
passenger. Restatement, Torts § 348(b)(ii). See also Rose v. City of Chicago, 317
Ill. App. 1, 45 N.E.2d 717 (1942).
The Ohio rule on "fellow-passenger" injuries is in substantial accord with the
general rule. Floyd v. Cleveland, 9 Ohio App. 282, 123 N.E.2d 540 (1955); Schafer
v. Youngstown Municipal R.R., 19 Ohio L. Abs. 205 (Ct. App. 1935); Paal v. Cleveland
R.R., 11 Ohio App. 462 (1918); 8 Ohio Jur. 2d "Carriers" §§ 221, 222 (1954). It is
highly unlikely that Ohio would be presented with a situation like that in the principal
case, due to the difference in customs.
3 Bullock v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1959). The
court cited Hall v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 84 Fla. 9, 93 So. 151 (1921); Kenan v.
Houstoun, 150 Fla. 357, 7 So.2d 837 (1942).
4 162 F. Supp. at 205.
5 Ibid.
6 Nute v. Boston & M.R.R., 214 Mass. 184, 100 N.E. 1099 (1913).
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person was allowed to board a train; 7 (3) a drunk and boisterous person was
allowed to board a train, and the conductor was warned of trouble by
another passenger; 8 (4) a disorderly white person was known to be seated
in a segregated negro railway car; 9 (5) a street car operator heard verbal
threats pass between two passengers, one negro and one white.10 Conversely,
foreseeability has been found missing where: (1) a female passenger was
insulted by an assailant, and had threatened him lest he insult her again;"
(2) the plaintiff was shoved from a railway car while a pistol duel was in
progress between two other passengers, the conductor being fully aware of
the duel; 12 (3) an obviously intoxicated, but not boisterous, person was
allowed to board a municipal bus.13
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals here relied upon the
same case which recites the general rule of foreseeability. 14 However, the
former reasoned that since there had been no previous similar outbreaks of
violence in the several years since integration forces had come to be felt in
the South, the defendant had no reason to anticipate violence.15 The Court
of Appeals rejected this reasoning, basing its decision upon customs of the
area. The court found that the drivers knew those customs and noted that
two company bulletins had warned drivers of racial disturbances. It is also
inferred that the drivers knew of plaintiffs' foreign nationality and probable
inexperience with "southern tradition."'16 The court termed it ". . . the com-
monly and generally known fact . . ."17 that plaintiffs' position on the bus
would cause a reasonable man, familiar with local custom, to anticipate
violence.
The basic difference between the views of the two courts lies in the
Court of Appeals' recognition of "southern tradition" and local "folkways.' 18
This is the superior approach to this case, as all the pertinent factual circum-
stances should be considered in determining foreseeability. These circum-
stances include, certainly, the social framework in which the events take
place. Failure to include this consideration in the test of foreseeability, and
insistence upon a prior similar occurrence, results, necessarily, in a rule
analogous to a "one free bite" rule. The Court of Appeals has filled the gap
in the logic of such a rule. Tim Applegate
7 Kinsey v. Hudson & M.R.R., 130 N.J.L. 285, 32 A.2d 497 (1943).
8 Kline v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 146 Wis. 134, 131 N.V. 427 (1911).
9 Hilman v. Georgia R. & Banking Co., 126 Ga. 814, 56 S.E. 68 (1906).
10 Case v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 238 Mo. App. 1029, 192 S.W.2d 595 (1946).
11 Hoff v. Public Service Ry., 91 N.J.L. 641, 103 Ati. 209 (1918).
12 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Brown, 111 Ark. 288, 163 S.W. 525 (1914).
13 Munter v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 258 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. App. 1953).
14 Hall v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., supra note 3. The general rule is substantially
the same as that noted previously. Two judges dissented on the question of foresee-
ability of danger.
15 Bullock v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc., 162 F. Supp. at 205.
I' Bullock v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d at 332.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
